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Monday, April 11, 2011

PERBICARAAN ANWAR IBRAHIM - KES LIWAT 2 - 2011 - HARI 52

TRANSKRIP PERBICARAAN DATUK SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM 24 MAC, 2011

Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 KL
Di hadapan Yang Arif Dato’ Mohamad Zabidin Mohd Diah

Pihak-pihak:
PP: Semua hadir
PB: KS, SN, Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, Marissa
WB: Zambri Idrus (for complainant)
AI hadir.

[9.11 a.m.] Pihak-pihak masuk ke Kamar Hakim.
[9.28 a.m.] Pihak-pihak keluar dari Kamar Hakim.

[9.47 a.m.]

MY: Kes untuk pendakwaan memanggil semula SP15, bekas Supt. Amidon dan SP6, Puan Aidora untuk tujuan mengemukakan eksibit-eksibit secara rasmi, YA.

YA: Ya, teruskan.

KS: Before my learned friend proceed with the witnesses, we have in fact filed a Notis Usul this morning asking for your Lordship to review the ruling that was made yesterday.

YA: Yesterday’s ruling?

KS: Yes. The grounds are set out in the affidavit and in fact I’m told that the file is in your Lordship’s room, probably by now. It is only filed today, but not already there.

YA: Never mind, since you have filed it. But we can proceed with this one. Later on we can deal with whatever application you make.

KS: Our application is very fundamental that these items ought not to go in. If these witnesses are called, the items go in and marked as exhibit.

YA: Okay, marked as exhibit….

KS: You can’t do that unless…

YA: But then later on if I hear you and if I decide in your favour it will be expunged also.

KS: That is not the point. The moment it is marked as exhibit it become public document.

YA: It can be expunged.

KS: That can even be published in the press. You should avoid that.

YA: That is nothing to do with…Sorry, Mr. Karpal. We have to proceed with this. We will deal with your application later.

KS: Sorry is not the right word to use. I think it goes beyond sorry. It’s very important that this application be heard first. Prerequisite, my Lord. Your Lordship should not do something which is inconsistent with your reason. Because if this document go in as exhibit as I kept saying just now, it become public document.

YA: So what?
KS: The prejudice will be there is confusion. Surely your Lordship can see that. Male Y. Tomorrow the papers will say male Y is the accused. Can we allow that? And later your Lordship decides otherwise and said this documents are inadmissible. Harm done. Could we see your Lordship in chambers? I will explain to your Lordship . Let’s not be hasty, my Lord. Hasty judge can be a dangerous judge. Can we see your Lordship in chambers now? It’s very pertinent. Important. Must be done, ought to be done, should be done. Can we see your Lordship in chambers for a while? Just for 5 minutes.

YA: I can’t see you alone.

KS: Of course, with my learned friend.

MY: YA, I’m puzzled. Because with regard to the document become public, evidence has been adduced to that effect and reported in papers. What is not before the court is only the marking “P”. That’s all. With regard to the evidence, they are already in public domain.

KS: No. [].

MY: Public domain, yes. Aidora has given evidence that she compared the…I mean, it was already there. Otherwise…

KS: Could we see your Lordship in chambers? I think it requires more []. My learned friend should be fair.

MY: I have been very fair.

KS: Can we see your Lordship in chambers, my Lord? Just for a while. It is very important. Must be done.

YA: May I see both parties in chambers now?

[9.51 a.m.] Stand down.

[9.52 a.m.] Pihak-pihak masuk ke Kamar Hakim.
[10.03 a.m.] Pihak-pihak keluar dari Kamar Hakim.

[10.08 a.m.]

Permohonan 44-65-2011: Application to review the ruling made on 23rd March 2011.

KS: This is an application for your Lordship to review the ruling made yesterday with regard to the review made on the ruling on 8th March 2011.

I come first to the ruling made on 8th March 2011. I appreciate what the ruling was where the evidence relating to the toothbrush, “Good Morning” towel and the mineral bottle and all the evidence relating to it to be excluded from the trial on the ground that the evidence were obtained by unfair methods and unfair means.

YA has reviewed the ruling yesterday in the light of the evidence given by Supt. Jude which is in the general trial where Lordship is of the view that the ruling made on 8th March 2011 has to be reviewed and that this evidence can be admitted as evidence. I don’t know whether your Lordship did not appreciate the two areas in our submission that we have made. All you Lordship say was the arrest which your Lordship found unlawful to be lawful in the light of the evidence by Supt. Jude that there was a valid warrant of arrest.

We submitted on the lock up rules. Was the lock-up rules, specifically on rule 20, complied with? What does rule 20 says? It states this – Masa rehat. A suspect must be kept in the lockup from 6.00 p.m to 6.00 a.m. the next morning and cannot be taken out and so forth. No interrogation can be made. We have the authority to this effect which renders the detention unlawful and horrendous. We cited the case of Dato’ Mokhtar Hashim and Lee Chee Meng.

Fair enough if you found that the arrest was lawful. But the detention which is more important, not the arrest. The detention of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim remains unlawful the moment he is not put in the lockup after 6.00 p.m. []. Not put in the lock up at all at 6 o’clock. The requirement is after 6.00 p.m. to be in the lock up.

What happened then? He was brought to HKL at 8.30 p.m. but this was between 6.00 p.m and 6.00 a.m. the next morning. And therefore this is a clear case of contravention of rule 20.. [] subject to rule 20 and [] unfair methods and unfair means. Therefore your Lordship with respect disregarded. The ruling by your Lordship is completely does not touch at all upon the lock up rules, rule 20, the detention on 17.07.2008.

We have the authority. The Federal Court decision, Dato’ Mokhtar Hashim. Your Lordship may not be bound by J James Foong in Lee Chee Meng. If you contravene rule 20, it will make the caution statement recorded at that time inadmissible. In fact on that ground alone your Lordship has to be [] but your Lordship did not do so. []

The 2nd area which is as important as the one which we have submitted before. The police personnel in charge of the lock up after DSP Yahya has supplied the toothbrush, the “Good Morning” towel and mineral bottle, [] but they were directed specifically not to touch the item. Why are they directed not to touch the item? It is obvious that the detention of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was for query samples for DNA profiling on the toothbrush, “Good Morning” towel and mineral bottle.

We say your Lordship has completely disregarded what is in Goi Ching Ang. What did the highest court in land says? []

“Evidence obtained in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused person or by trick or by conduct of which the policy ought to take advantage, would operate unfairly against the accused and should in the discretion of the court be rejected for admission.’

And from the two areas I have submitted earlier, it falls in the [] trick. That is what Federal Court says. Trick or by conduct of which the policy ought to take advantage. We have no benefit from hearing []. Your Lordship should review the ruling that your Lordship has made in the light of the ruling your Lordship have made on 8th March 2011.

It does not matter what’s going on by now. A judge []. your Lordship ought to completely disregarded. [] the oath your Lordship took when appointed as a judge. I urge your Lordship to take time to resign, not to retire from office, but for a while.[].

Under those circumstances, we would submit that your Lordship should once again be cautious in mind that you should review what your Lordship has done yesterday. Your Lordship is not functius officio. []

MY: I agree that until judgment is given your Lordship is not functious officio. But the question is is there any basis of having the benefit now to review the basis claimed by the defence that you have not considered?

Rule 20 is something that all defence counsel will refer to as far as admissibility of caution statement is involved. In Dato’ Mokhtar Hashim, yes. The caution statement is [] because the issue is not whether you have breach the rule or not.. [] and applying this law, rule 20 in our case, it says you must be detained. Just because the law says you must be detained, does not mean you must be put in the lock up.

Yes, they went to the hospital at 8.30 p.m. but nothing was taken from Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim and the lock up between 6.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. DSP Jude was in fact cross-examined by En. Karpal whether he knows what happened between that time and he answered Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was his family member and his counsel after he came back from the hospital. None of the counsel suggested that they have breached the rule at that time because when it is convenient to them it is okay. But now, when it is not okay, they contended that the police breached rule 20. So rule 20 has no obligation.

If YA remember, these items were collected at 11.00 something in the morning on the next day. The instruction not to touch the items was not given before that, but after Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was released. The instruction was made by DSP Yahya.

In the Notis Usul and the affidavit, it was stated that DSP Jude instructed the police not to touch anything. But actually it was DSP Yahya and I have pointed it out to my learned friend. And the person who instructed Amidon to collect the items from the lock up was Dato’ Koh Chin Wah, OCCI of KL. The instruction came from higher rank. That’s why DSP Jude himself did not give instruction. Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was placed in the lock up later than 6.00 p.m. Just because he is placed in the lock up after 6.00 p.m. does not make it unlawful. [].

I really see nothing there for your Lordship to review. Rule 20 does not apply because nothing was taken from Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim and the lock up between that time. With regard to collecting the exhibit in the lock up after Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was released, that is normal. But what important is what transpires in Jude’s mind.

I humbly pray for this application to be dismissed.

KS: The application we made is not with regard to []. What is important is your Lordship consider the two areas. My learned friend accept that rule 20 is mandatory. [] he said it is on the caution statement. The principle is important. That is something done against the law and your Lordship has a discretion to exclude it. It is as simple as that. My lf does not dispute that direction was given to police personnel at the lockup not to touch the items. []. These are the areas that your Lordship does not consider. I don’t think I can go any further than that. That’s all.

YA: Give me 10 minutes. Start at 10.40 a.m.

[10.31 a.m.] Stand down.

[10.40 a.m.]

YA: This is my ruling. After going through the defence’s Notis Usul and affidavit, I see no reason to review the ruling I made yesterday. Application dismissed.

MY: Much obliged. Izinkan kami memanggil saksi kami iaitu SP15, Supt Amidon.

SP15 : Bekas Supt. Amidon b. Anan.
SP15 mengangkat sumpah di dalam Bahasa Melayu.

Q: Supt. Amidon, sebelum ini kamu telah beri keterangan di mahkamah pada 17.07.2008 di lokap D9, IPK KL kamu telah mengambil 4 barang kes, iaitu satu helai bulu, satu berus gigi, satu tuala “Good Morning” dan satu botol air mineral.
A: Ya.

Q: Dan kemudian kamu telah memberi keterangan bahawa kamu telah masukkan keempat-empat barang tersebut dalam sampul surat yang berasingan dan kemudian kamu seal sampul surat tersebut dan kamu turunkan tandatangan. Benar?
A: Ya.

NH: Mohon saksi dirujuk ID57.

Q: Cuba lihat ID57. Ada atau tidak tandatangan yang kamu buat di belakang ID57 tersebut?
A: Ada.

NH: Pohon ID57 ditandakan sebagai P57.

ID57 ditandakan sebagai P57.

Q: Cuba lihat kandungan P57. Ada sampul itu ada atau tidak sehelai bulu yang dikepilkan pada sehelai kertas yang kamu tandatangan?
A: Ada.

Q: Kamu camkan?
A: Ya.

NH: Pohon ID57 ditanda P57A.

ID57A ditanda sebagai P57A.

NH: Seterusnya pohon saksi dirujuk ID58.

Q: Ada atau tidak tandatangan kamu di belakang sampul ini?
A: Ada.

Q: Kamu camkan?
A: Ya.

NH: Pohon ID58 ditanda sebagai P58.

ID58 ditanda sebagai P58.

Q: Lihat kandungan. Ada atau tidak sebatang berus gigi berwarna putih?
A: Ada

NH: Pohon ID58A ditanda sebagai P58A.

ID58A ditanda sebagai P58A.

NH: Seterusnya mohon saksi dirujuk ID59.

Q: Cuba lihat ada tandatangan kamu di belakang sampul ini?
A: Ada.

NH: Pohon ID59 ditanda sebagai P59.

ID59 ditanda sebagai P59.

Q: Lihat kandungannya. Ada atau tidak sehelai tuala “Good Morning” yang kamu tandatangan pada tuala tersebut?
A: Ada.

NH: Pohon ID59A sebagai P59A.

ID59A ditanda P59A.

NH: Mohon saksi dirujuk ID61.

Q: Ada atau tidak tandatangan kamu di situ?
A: Ada, di bahagian belakang.

Q: Kamu camkan?
A: YA.

NH: Pohon ID61 ditanda sebagai P61.

ID61 ditanda sebagai P61.

Q: Lihat kandungannya. Ada atau tidak satu botol air mineral yang ada tandatangan kamu di bontot atau di belakangnya?
A: Ada.

NH: Pohon ID61A ditanda sebagai P61A.

ID61A ditanda sebagai P61A.

NH: Itu sahaja soalan saya.

KS: We have no question, YA.

NH: Mohon saksi dilepaskan. Saksi seterusnya, SP6 ialah Aidora. Pn. Noorin akan ambil alih.

SP6 : Pn. Nor Aidora Binti Saedon
SP6 mengangkat sumpah di dalam Bahasa Inggeris.

Q: On 23rd February 2011, you have testified in court that on 17.07.2008 you received a request from DSP Jude as well as some items in 4 envelopes to be examined and analysed by you.

NB: YA, izinkan saya merujuk saksi pertamanya kepada sampul surat marked as P57.

YA: Dulu tak identify lagi ke?

NB: Dah. Saja nak minta dia confirmkan kerana semasa dahulu ia ditanya melalui saksi ini, YA.

YA: Ye la, ID. Sekarang P. Benda tu kan sama.

NB: Yes, I just want her to identify again.

Q: So, Puan Aidora, can you just confirm whether this is the enveloped that you received on 17.07.2008 from DSP jude as well as the content in it which has now marked as P57A.
A: Yes, I identify it.

NB: P57 and P57A identified, YA.

P57 and P57A identified.

Q: Seterusnya Aidora, you also received enveloped marked “D1” now marked as P58. Can you please confirm that this envelope as well as the content of it that you also received on 17.07.2008 from DSP Jude to be examined and analysed?
A: Yes, I confirm.

P58 and P58A identified.

Q: Seterusnya, refer to P59 and P59A. Can you please confirm that this envelope as well as the content of it that you also received on 17.07.2008 from DSP Jude to be examined and analysed?
A: YA, I confirm.

NB: P59 and P59A identified, YA.

P59 and P59A identified.

Q: You did something on this towel, I believe. You found a strand of hair and you have isolate that all and put in an envelope ID60 and the content ID60A. Can you confirm this is the exhibit, Pn. Aidora?
A: YA, I confirm.

NB: May this ID60 and ID60A marked as P60 and P60A?

ID60 marked as P60.
ID60A marked as P60A.

Q: Seterusnya Pn. Aidora, you also received another envelope marked as “D3” now marked as P61 and the content as P61A. Can you confirm this is the exhibit?
A: YA, I confirm.

NB: P61 and P61A identified, YA.

P61 and P61A identified.

Q: You also prepared a chemist report dated 22.07.2008. Can we have ID61 to be shown to the witness? Can you please confirm that this is the report that you have prepared with regard to the examination and analysis that you have conducted on these items?
A: YA, this is the report prepared by me.

NB: YA, can we have this ID62 be marked as P62?

ID62 marked as P62.

Q: And you have also printed out the EPG, electro-pherogram of your analysis which was marked before as ID 63. Is this the EPG of your analysis, Pn. Aidora?
A: YA, I confirm this is the EPG printed pertaining to this case.

NB: May we have ID63 be marked as P63, YA?

ID63 marked as P63.

NB: That would be all, YA.

KS: We have no question.

NB: May we have this witness to be released, YA?

MY: YA, pendakwaan menutup kes kami dan kami menawarkan 73 witnesses to the defence. Untuk kemudahan, telah dinyatakan di sebelah nama mereka siapa mereka itu.

YA: (to defence) I’m sure this is not fair to ask you to decide now who you want to call in the event the defence is called. Can we leave it as it is or you want to decide now who you want to call?

KS: We need a short break, YA so that we can decide it straight away.

YA: I will give you some time before I can hear the submission. In the mean time you can go through so masa submission you can let me know siapa nak panggil.

KS: Very well.

YA: So when can I hear the submission?

MY: Saya mencadangkan 2 minggu diberikan kepaada kedua-dua pihak untuk menyediakan hujahan. Jika di akhir 2 minggu itu pihak-pihak ada bundle or written submission to exchange and to be filed in court, then whatever reply to that written submission can be taken during the submission proper on the third week.

YA: (to defence) Is it okay?

KS: I hope we are given 3 weeks instead of 2 weeks, YA. I think we may take some time.

MY: Sama juga, YA. Saya pun minta macam tu tadi.

YA: But I hope the parties can exchange within 2 weeks. How about 18.04.2011? It will be on Monday. But how long would it take to hear the submission?

Satu hari boleh siap ke? Ataupun two days? Kalau tak siap one day we’ll just continue. So that would be 18.04.2011.

[10.55 a.m.] Adjourned.

PERBICARAAN ANWAR IBRAHIM - KES LIWAT 2 - 2011 - HARI 51

TRANSKRIP PERBICARAAN DATUK SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM 23 MAC, 2011

Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 KL
Di hadapan Yang Arif Dato’ Mohamad Zabidin Mohd Diah

Pihak-pihak:
PP: Semua hadir kecuali NH
PB: KS, SN, Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, Ram Karpal, Marissa
AI hadir

[8.59 a.m.]

MY: YA, kecuali Dato’ Nordin, pihak-pihak masih sama.

YA: At the end of trial within a trial I had ruled the toothbrush, the Good Morning towel and plastic bottle and evidence related to those items especially on the evidence relating to the DNA analysis conducted on those items could not be tendered as evidence. There was no doubt even at that time those evidence were relevant and admissible but I have excluded them on the ground that they were obtained through unfair means.

The decision to exclude those evidence was based on the evidence available at that time especially the evidence tendered during trial within a trial. It was made without the benefit of the evidence from the Investigating

Officer who was not called as witness in the trial within a trial. The evidence tendered in court at that time without the investigating officer tend to support the defence assertion that the accused was illegally arrested and his subsequent detention in the cell was nothing but to deploy designed to collect the DNA samples by trick.

Now in the light of the evidence adduced from the Investigating Officer and the Arresting Officer during the main trial, it is clear that the arrest of the accused are in fact lawful. His subsequent detention in the cell was indeed lawful and for a lawful purpose. Thus, the detention of the accused in the cell could not longer said to be done for the purpose of obtaining DNA evidence from him by trick as alleged by the defence.

In those circumstances, the court has no discretion but to allow those items collected from the cell and all evidence related to those items tendered as evidence. Therefore, I now ruled that those items and all evidence related to those items are admissible and could be tendered as evidence. My earlier ruling regarding this matter are accordingly reversed.

With regard to the application to compel the accused to give DNA sample, the learned DPP relied on Section 73 and Section 165 of the Evidence Act.

Section 73(2) specifically talks about directing any person who write any words or figures for the purpose to enabling the court to compare those words or figures with any word or figures to be written by that person. Section 73 (3) extended it to include finger impression.

After reading this section again and again, I find no amount of judicial creativity to justify extending this clear provision to also include DNA sample. Therefore, the application by the learned DPP to compel the accused to give his

DNA sample has to be rejected on the simple ground that there is no legal provision empowering the court to do so. That’s all.

MY: Much obliged. YA, as a matter of confirmatory I have to recall two witnesses just to tender the exhibits marked before as ID.

YA: But the exhibits can be tendered as P, kan?

MY: Yes, but I don’t want any problem to arise later because we have tendered it but for some reason they are marked as ID. I don’t have the witnesses here, YA. Can we do it tomorrow? I just want to call Aidora and Amidon.

Just to tender. Because today seems to be everything to be okay but I cannot afford any problem to arise later because there might be some challenges to it.

YA: So you cannot proceed with the case today because you don’t have those witnesses?

MY: Yes, I want to call the witnesses. After that I think it will take me about 20 minutes for both witnesses. And then I will close the case. Tomorrow, YA.

YA: Mr. Karpal?

KS: I have to be in the Court of Appeal in the morning. But that’s alright.

YA: Just to mark as exhibit. 9.00 a.m. tomorrow.

[9.04 a.m.] Adjourned.

PERBICARAAN ANWAR IBRAHIM - KES LIWAT 2 - 2011 - HARI 50

TRANSKRIP PERBICARAAN DATUK SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM 21 MAC, 2011

Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 KL
Di hadapan Yang Arif Dato’ Mohamad Zabidin Mohd Diah

Pihak-pihak:
PP: Semua hadir
PB: KS, SN, Ram Karpal, Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, Marissa
WB: Zambri Idrus (for complainant)
AI hadir

[9.22 a.m.]

MY: Kes ditetapkan untuk hujahan balas oleh En. Karpal Singh. Saya dimaklumkan bahawa Encik Karpal sudah sampai dan ada di luar.

PC: My Lord, our apologies. Mr. Karpal, he supposes to submit, and he is outside.

KS: First, my apologies because late.

YA: Proceed.

KS: YA, submissions on behalf of DSAI (review of ruling and application for direction by the court for DSAI to provide samples for DNA profiling.

There is no dispute that the ruling made during the trial within a trial can be reviewed by the court. This has been held in Public Prosecutor v Mustaffa bin Ahmad [1986] 1 MLJ 302 [Tab 1] as far back as 9.1.77 even before R v Watson [1980] 2 AER 293 [Tab 2] decided by the English Court of Appeal (Criminal

Division) on 12.2.80.

In Mustaffa bin Ahmad, Ibrahim J ruled the cautioned statement in that case which was admitted in the TWT was ruled inadmissible when the learned judge, after hearing the evidence as a whole, was not sure about the inducement perpetrated on the accused in that case. However, there was compelling evidence which caused the learned judge to review his ruling, unlike in our case. A 5-man bench of Federal Court upheld his decision on 23.1.78. However, no written judgment was delivered (see Editorial Note at page 303).

The parameters as to the position where a ruling in a TWT can be reviewed in the light of subsequent evidence in the general trial are set out in Watson in the following terms:-

‘Because a judge retains control over the evidence to be submitted to the jury throughout a trial, he is not precluded, by the fact that he has already ruled at a trial within a trial in the jury’s absence that a written statement by the accused is admissible in evidence as being voluntary, from reconsidering that ruling at a later stage of the trial if further evidence emerges which is relevant to the voluntary character of the statement, and from ruling in the light of that evidence that the statement is not admissible.’

In the course of his judgment, Cummins- Bruce LJ had occasion to say at page 295:-

‘It is the duty of the judge to exclude from the jury’s consideration evidence which is inadmissible. In the case of a written statement, made or signed by the accused, the judge must be satisfied that the prosecution have proved that the contested statement was voluntary, before allowing the jury to decide whether to act on it. Experience has shown that where the question of the voluntary character of a statement has been investigated and decided at a trial within a trial. It is only very rare and unusual case that further evidence later emerges which may cause the judge to reconsider the question whether he is still satisfied that the statement was voluntary and admissible. But where there is such further evidence the judge has power to consider the relevance of the admissibility of evidence on which he has already ruled.’

Although jury trials have been abolished in the country since 17.2.95, a judge sitting alone now acts both as judge and jury as aptly set out by the Federal Court in Sia Soon Suan v Public Prosecutor [1966] I MLJ 116 at page 118 [Tab 3] as follows:-

‘Irrespective of whether this court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of an accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else. This is axiomatic. The directions that we give a jury are no less to be hearkened to by ourselves.’

It is trite that a TWT is held for the purpose of admission of evidence to determine the admissibility of evidence to include in the main trial. It follows that all evidence available by the prosecution to rebut assertions made by an accused must be given in that mini trial. This evidence cannot be withheld for the purpose of a review subsequent to a ruling made by the court. All available evidence has to be investigated and decided at a trial within a trial. It is only in very rare and unusual cases if further evidence later emerges (which must be evidence not available during the TWT) that may cause a judge to review his earlier ruling. The prosecution cannot keep up its sleeve evidence available during the TWT and introduce it after a ruling has been made by court for review. This would be the abuse of process by the prosecution and itself may amount to deception on the court. The accused is constitutionally entitled to a fair trial and fair methods of prosecution and not after thoughts and unscrupulous means to upset a ruling already made by court.

In Tan Too Kia v PP [1980] 2 MLJ 187 [Tab 4], a decision of the Federal Court, an Inspector had specifically been identified at the TWT as one of the persons who had assaulted the accused. The Federal Court held that the inspector ought to have been called by the prosecution in rebuttal in the TWT to contradict the accused. In his judgment, Suffian LP, at page 188, says:-

‘We are of the opinion that this failure by Mr. Karpal Singh was not fatal. The voluntariness of the statement was not in issue when Inspector Lias was giving evidence earlier in the general trial. It came into issue only during the trial within a trial. As the Inspector was specifically identified at the trial within a trial as one of the persons who had assaulted the accused, he should have been called by the prosecution to contradict the accused. It would have been very easy for the prosecution to call the Inspector because he had been identified and was available.’

The TWT was conducted by the court for the purpose of determining whether there was sufficient material for the court to exercise its discretion to exclude the DNA profiling from the Good Morning towel, the toothbrush and the mineral water bottle seized by the police from the lock up at the IPK, KL where

DSAI had been detained overnight from 16.7.08 to 17.7.08.

Although in the TWT, DSAI adverted to the role of Taufik and Supt Jude Perreira, the prosecution elected only to call Taufik in rebuttal in TWT.

Taufik attempted to produce a Photostat copy of the warrant of arrest which was only marked as an ID and, therefore could not be considered as evidence in the TWT. A Photostat copy of a document is not admissible as evidence in a court of law. It was in the TWT that primary evidence of the document ought to have been given if the original record had been lost or destroyed.

In KPM Khidmat Sdn Bhd v Tey Kim Suie [1994] 2 MLJ 627 [Tab 5], the Supreme Court had occasion to hold:-

‘When documentary evidence is tendered, primary evidence of the said document must be adduced except if it can be shown that the original record had been lost or destroyed. The burden of proving that the record book had been lost or destroyed lies on the party seeking to adduce secondary evidence of the contents of the record book’.

The prosecution cannot, by producing the original warrant of arrest in the main trial, now, cure the infirmity. It is in evidence that 3 copies of the warrant of arrest were in the possession of Jude Perreira. The evidence of the warrant of arrest was available during the TWT.

Even Supt Jude Perreira whose role was adverted to by DSAI during the TWT, chose not to take the stand despite having had the opportunity to have produced the original copy of the warrant of arrest in the TWT.

It was during the TWT that Supt. Jude Perreira should have testified. It would be ridiculous and unacceptable lawfully for the court to accept his evidence in the general trial for the purpose of rebutting DSAI’s evidence in TWT that the DNA profiling from the Good Morning towel, toothbrush and mineral water bottle had been obtained by unfair means and his arrest had been procured unlawfully.

In fact, Jude’s evidence in the general trial confirms that there had been non-compliance with Rule 20 of the lock-up Rules, 1953 in that DSAI, after his arrest on 16.7.08, had not been placed in the lock-up from 6pm to 6am the following day. The provisions of Rule 20 are mandatory. In KPM Khidmat Sdn Bhd v Tey Kim Suie [1994] 2 MLJ 627, the Federal Court had occasion to hold the interrogation ranging into the early hours of the morning of an accused was in breach of Rule 20 of the Lock Up Rules (see also PP v Lee Chee Meng & Anor [1991] I MLJ 226 [Tab 6]).

If this was the position in our case, which it was, then clearly, DSAI’s being taken to the HKL in breach of Rule 20 reflected unfair means and unfair methods being employed by the police to obtain the DNA profiling from the items set out herein before. The position is further compounded by the evidence of Supt. Jude Perreira in the general trial that he did not direct police personnel in charge of the lock up not to touch the said items despite the police personnel in the general trial before the TWT, clearly saying that him had done so.

So the position come to this, Supt. Jude and his evidence on oath in the main trial support the defence case that unfair methods and unfair means had been used by the police to obtain DNA profiling from the items set out herein before.

From the ruling made by the court to exclude the items, it is clear it was based on unfair means and unfair methods employed by the police meaning it was by trick and deception that the police attempted to introduce the DNA evidence.

In any event from the evidence of Supt. Taufik given in the TWT and the general trial, the ground of arrest could not have been given by him in the Segambut as this is, clearly, contradicted by the evidence of SN Nair and DSAI. The question of challenging evidence given in the main trial by Supt Taufek and Jude Perreira does not arise. It was assertion made under oath by DSAI that his arrest was unlawful and unfair methods, unfair means had been used to obtain his DNA profiling in the TWT stood unchallenged by the prosecution by leading lawful evidence in rebuttal of those assertion. In fact, an adverse inference should be drawn by the court against the prosecution for not having done so on the authorities of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad [2010] 3 MLJ 174 at 189 [tab 7], a decision of the Federal Court handed down by Alauddin bin Dato’ Mohd Sheriff PCA which after reviewing all previous authorities on the issue, said:-

‘My respectful view is that the revocation letter by itself to a certain extent that created an impression that the formality of advising the Yang di-Pertua Agong was not done by the first respondent. However looking at the affidavits filed in support of the respondent’s application, there is more than sufficient evidence to show that the formality was done. We have the affidavit evidence of Hj. Jaapar who had affirmed that YDPA had accepted the decision and the advice of the first respondent pertaining to the revocation of the first appellant. The appellant did not contradict the said evidence. It is a well settled principle governing the evaluation of affidavit evidence that where one party makes a positive assertion upon a material issue, the failure of his opponent to materially contradict it is usually treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted (see Ng Hee Thong & Anor v Public Bank Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 MLJ 29; Alloy Automotive Sdn. Bhd v Perusahaan Ironfield Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 382; Overseas Investment Pte. Ltd v Anthony William O’Brien & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 332). (This principle equally applies to oral evidence given in court like the one in the nature of TWT).

With respect, we agree fully with the findings of the Court of Appeal as mentioned above.’

The submission of the learned DPP that Goi Ching Ang v PP [1999] 1 MLJ 507 [Tab 8] related to a section 27 information only is misconceived. The principle in Goi Ching Ang enunciated by a strong 5 man bench of the Federal Court, after adverting to various authorities in the Commonwealth including Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182, Kuruma Son of Kaniu v R [1955] 1 All ER 236 and R v Sang [1980] AC 402, mentioned at page 526, although not included in the cases referred to at pages 511-511 is set out in absolute terms with regard to discretion of a court to exclude evidence obtained by unfair means and unfair methods as follows at page 508:-

‘There is a vested discretion in a trial judge to exclude evidence which is prejudicial to an accused even though the said evidence may be technically admissibility. Evidence obtained in an oppressive manner by force or against the wishes of an accused person or by trick or by conduct of which the policy ought to take advantage, would operate unfairly against the accused and should in the discretion of the court be rejected for admission.’

This principle is of general application and nowhere in the judgment did the Federal Court say it was restricted only to sec 27 information.

Any attempt to dilute the impact of the principles referred to above is a disservice to the Federal Court.

The attempt by the learned DPP to import English law by virtue of section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Court which reads:-

‘5. Laws of England when applicable.
As regards matters of criminal procedure for which no special provision has been made by this code or by any other law for the time being in force the law relating to criminal procedure for the time being in force in England shall be applied so far as the same shall not conflict or be inconsistent with this Code and can be made auxiliary thereto.’ is misconceived.
What this section imports and implies is where there is a lacuna in procedure, then this section can be availed of, and not where the law relates to evidence. Therefore, section 5 of the CPC cannot import section 62 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which concerns evidence, similar to our Evidence Act 1950.

In PP v Sanassi [1970] 2 MLJ 198 [Tab 9] at 201, Sharma J, with regard to section 5 of the Straits Settlement Criminal Procedure Court (in exact terms with section 5 of the CPC), had this to say:-

‘It is entirely a matter for the legislature to decide whether the procedure of the courts in this country, which is now sovereign and independent, should depend upon a foreign enactment and whether any amendment made to its own laws by a foreign Government should still continue to remain binding on us who have a supreme legislature of our own. I say so with some emphasis because most of our present law graduates are locally qualified and they should not generally be concerned with how the Parliament of England prescribes a procedure granting a right to the accused to make a statement from the dock or how and why such a right is modified or taken away by that Parliament.’

In fact, the Parliament has passed the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Identification Act, 2009 [Tab 10] to which Royal assent was given on 19.08.09.

However the Act has yet to be brought into force.

This court cannot through judicial activism, direct DSAI to give samples for DNA profiling. In any event, section 62 of PACE only provides for the police to take intimate samples with safeguards, including consent to be given by the suspect. Section 62 does not empower the court to direct an accused person in an ongoing trial to give samples for DNA purposes.

Section 165 of Evidence Act limits judicial intervention in a trial. Of course, the unprecedented application for YA to direct DSAI to give samples for DNA profiling is unheard of and unprecedented in the Commonwealth and perhaps elsewhere. Judicial activism has its limits.

In Lim Chin Poh v PP [1969] 2 MLJ 159 [Tab 11], the court held:-

‘it is desirable that the district judges and magistrates should bear in mind that the first and most important thing for the administration of the criminal law is that it should appear that the accused is having a fair trial and that he should not be left with any sense of injustice and certainly not on the ground that the trial judge was prejudiced against him. Where the prosecution and the defence are both represented by counsel, as they were in this case, the trial judge should refrain from intervening unless it is absolutely necessary.’

In Teng Boon How v PR [1993] 3 MLJ 553 [Tab 12], the Supreme Court had occasion to with regard to the limitations of the provisions of section 165 of the Evidence Act to hold:-

‘Notwithstanding the wide ambit of s 165 of the Evidence Act 1950, the desirable limits of judicial intervention in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses as set out under the common law of England apply in this country. These limits apply with double force in the case of interrogation by a judge of an accused person, since the nature of examination contemplated by s 165 of the Evidence Act 1950 is not examination or cross-examination of an inquisitorial nature for the purpose of entrapping an accused or of extracting from him damaging admissions upon which to build up a case against him or to supply a gap in the evidence for the prosecution, especially in the case of a capital charge. The failure of a trial judge sitting alone, to direct himself correctly in accordance with these principles must be treated in the same way as a failure to direct a jury correctly.’

The following passage in the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 All ER 155 [Tab 13] at page 562 in Teng Boon How emphasizing the importance of a judge not descending into the arena and thereby depriving himself of the ability to take a detached view when forming his decision bears repetition:-

‘Yes, he the judge must keep his vision unclouded. It is all very well to paint justice blind, but she does better without a bandage round her eyes.

She should be blind indeed to favor or prejudice, but clear to see which way lies the truth; and the less dust there is the better. Let the advocates one after the other put the weight into the scale – the nicely calculated less or more – but the judge at the end decides which way the balance tilts, be it ever so slightly…so also it is for the advocates, each in his turn, to examine the witnesses, not for the judge to take it on himself lets by so doing he appear to favor one side or the other. And it is for the advocate to state his case as fairly and strongly as he can, without undue interruption, lest by the sequence of his argument be lost…The judges’ part in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking question of witness when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law, to exclude irrelevancy and discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth, and at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of a judge and assumes the robe of an advocate; and the change does not become him well. Lord Chancellor Bacon spoke right when he said that: ‘Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.’

The position with regard to DNA profiling has been lucidly set out by KC Vohrah J (as he then was) in Peter James Binstead v Juvencia Autor Partose

[2000] 2 MLJ 569 [Tab 14] as follows:-

‘There is no general power provided by legislation or through common law for any court in Malaysia to order a person to undergo a test to ascertain paternity. In the case of a DNA test, it is common knowledge that either a blood, a tissue or bone specimen will be taken from the person for testing. If a person refuses to submit himself to such a testing, he is perfectly entitled to do so; a person cannot be subject to hurt within the meaning of sec 323 of the Penal Code for voluntarily causing hurt to the person and a court cannot in the absence of a specific legislative provision, order such person to submit himself to an unlawful act to be committed on his person.’

The learned DPP’s reference to sections 73 and 165 of the Evidence Act [Tab 15] is clearly misplaced. Section 73 refers to comparisons of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved whereby the court can direct any person to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the court to compare those words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by that person. Subsection (3) of section 73 makes subsection (2) applicable to finger impressions. In our case, the learned DPP has presumed the DNA evidence sought to be adduced has been proven, when it has not been.

Section 165 provides for the power of a judge to put questions or order production of document or things. Section 73 and 165 cannot by any stretch of the imagination empower a court to direct an accused to provide samples for DNA profiling! Even the case cited by learned DPP, King-Emperor v Nga Tun Hiang

AIR 1924 Rang 115 [Tab 16], refers to the proviso that the power to take finger impressions under sec 73 of Evidence Act is qualified by the accused privilege against self incrimination.

Even in Goi Ching Ang, the Federal Court adverted to the principle against the right of self incrimination when holding at page 508:-

‘Admitting the s 27 information would infringe the principle of the right against self-incrimination since there was no evidence of s 112(ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) having been complied with. Since the trial judge had not exercised his discretion to exclude the s 27 information, the appellate court would be at liberty to do so’.

It is submitted that under the circumstances both applications by the prosecutions ought to be dismissed as being a manifest abuse of the process of this honorable court. So we pray for both applications to be dismissed.

Now coming to something which is substantial in court. It is in relation to YA’s caution that whoever commits contempt of court would have to face the music.

YA: That is outside of this submission. It is nothing to do with the application, right?

KS: That is not the point. A ruling was made, YA had cautioned. Various personality including the Prime Minister have committed on this application that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim ought to give his DNA. It is reference to this application, YA. It is contempt of court. The Prime Minister should be hold up here to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of court apart from other personalities who are very [] to go against YA’s caution which is given in open court. YA ought to stand on the by the caution YA has given and take action against those who have got against that caution.

YA: Yes DPP, any reply to this application?

MY: Application for contempt?

YA: No. This.

MY: May I just take the last case, Goi Ching Ang. In the submision, I’ve submitted that Goi Ching Ang is relevant on the factual matrix. The principle, yes it doesn’t come up with new law, but on the facts this is in aspect of S.27, information, which have been commented upon in the case of Wan Mohd Azman that in other cases other than confession, there is no necessity for balancing exercise.

With regard to the other cases, Lim Chin Poh v PP [1969] 2 MLJ 159 and Teng Boon How v PR [1993] 3 MLJ 553, again this cases are with regards to situation where the judge cross-examining the witnesses.

If I may first invite your Lordship to the case of Lim Chin Poh v PP [1969] 2 MLJ 159, the complaint in this case is because the judge interrupted so much but at page 162, paragraph F left,

“There is one other matter. Counsel for the appellant criticized the manner in which the learned district judge conducted the trial of the appellant. His complaint was that, by reason of the frequency and nature of the interruptions by the learned trial judge when the appellant was giving evidence, the appellant did not have a fair trial. It was alleged that the trial judge intervened on no less than fifteen occasions; that he cross-examined the appellant; that he made it known that he was displeased with the appellant; and that he was so thoroughly annoyed with the appellant that he gave vent to his feelings by imposing a severe sentence.”

So, it has no application to this case. Your Lordship has not cross-examine anybody yet.

With regard to the other case, Teng Boon How v PR [1993] 3 MLJ 553, if I may first refer your Lordship to page 562, the paragraph before the one referred to by my learned friend in his submission, if I can read paragraph C,

“It was Lord Greene MR who explained that justice is best done by a judge who holds the balance between the contending parties without himself taking part in their disputations. If a judge, said Lord Greene, in Yuill v Yuill, should personally conduct the examination of witnesses, ‘he, so to speak, descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict’”

And at page 564, in reference to the case at paragraph B,

“Nevertheless, we were reluctantly driven to the conclusion that the judge did, in this case, descend into the arena and did allow his judgment of the facts to be clouded by the results of his cross-examination of the appellant, the brother, Tan Booy Keng, and the taxi driver, Loh Chin Wah, though we do not doubt that he was actuated by the best of motives.

As for allowing his judgment of the facts to be clouded by the results of his cross-examination, we need no more than refer to the following extracts from his judgment,…”

In both cases, the judge took an active part in cross-examining the witnesses. So I do not think it really applies.

At case no. 14, Peter James Binsted v Juvencia Autor Partosa [2000] 2 MLJ 569,J KC Vohrah’s decision. This is with regards to affidavit evidence. We can read from the headnotes,

“The respondent applied for maintenance in the magistrates’ court under s 3(1) of the Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950 (‘the Act’). In her supporting affidavit, the respondent claimed that the appellant was her husband and that they had a child from the marriage. The respondent’s lawyer made an oral application to the court to order the appellant, the respondent and child to, inter alia, undergo a deoxyribonuclei acid (‘DNA’) test. The magistrate allowed the application and the appellant appealed against that decision.”

We do not know under which provision of the law the Magistrate is acting. It is a civil case. People take for granted that Evidence Act doesn’t apply to civil case. Normally they do not give any weight or attach any weight to the Evidence Act when they do civil cases. But what the judge said at page 571, slightly below paragraph A…

YA: You mean the Evidence Act doesn’t apply in civil cases?

MY: No. I mean is it is not quoted. People take for granted Evidence Act, somehow it doesn’t apply. Hearsay and all other things in civil trial. I mean it is very relax.

At page 571, slightly below paragraph A,

“At the outset it has to be noted that the Act has no provision to allow any court to make such an order.”

The Act here refers to Married Women and Children (Maintenance) Act 1950. Nobody tells J Vohrah that we have S.165 and maybe can be extended in context of S.73. Nobody says it there.

As far as both cases are concern, all said is different from the context of our case.

With regard to the statement at page 3 of the submission, this is with regard to the review, in the 3rd paragraph where my learned friend reproduces part of the judgment in R v Watson which reads,

“The prosecution cannot keep up its sleeve evidence available during the TWT and introduce it after a ruling has been made by court for review. This would be abuse of process by the prosecution…”

This statement is not backed by any authorities. But if I may remind this honorable court, before submission, after two days searching for the original warrant of arrest, then only we got hold of it. I compared it to the copy with the court and then I made a proper application to recall so that I can tender the warrant of arrest but it was refused by the court even though I cited S. 425 of Criminal Procedure Code and the case of Ramli b. Kechik and Pon Nam, both

Federal Court decision.

With regard to the IO, we didn’t call the IO just because of the voluntariness, to decide on the admissibility. The IO give evidence beyond that. But during the trial within a trial what is obvious is this, the onus is on them to prove but when Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim made the confession orally that he was informed before the start of the recording that there was a report alleging that he sodomised certain someone at certain time and address, I thought there it goes. There couldn’t have [] concession by Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim and less than certain denial with regard to Taufik’s assertion that he had read, explained and obtained the signature of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim with regard to the warrant of arrest, I do not think then it would be important for me to call Jude.

But this paragraph at page 3, can I now compare with what the judge in R v Watson says at page 2 of the submission,

“It is the duty of the judge to exclude from the jury’s consideration evidence which is inadmissible in the case of a written statement, made or signed by the accused, the judge must be satisfied that the prosecution have proved that the contested statement was voluntary, before allowing the jury to decide whether to act on it. Experience has shown that where the question of the voluntary character of a statement has been investigated and decided at a trial within a trial. It is only in very rare and unusual cases that further evidence later emerges which may cause the judge to reconsider the question whether he is still satisfied that the statement was voluntary and admissible. But where there is such further evidence the judge has power to consider the relevance of the admissibility of evidence on which he has already ruled”.

Nothing to support what En. Karpal Singh said. What they are saying is very rare further evidence later emerges. But further evidence did emerge and if it emerges, then the court should consider. If your Lordship remembers, when I started my submission the other day I said the review was based on two, (1)

because the emergence of further evidence; (2) that we perceived that your Lordship could have erred in the application of the law. That ‘s why we cited the case of PP v Ng Lai Huat & Ors [110] 2 MLJ 427which say there the judge on its own upon reviewing his ruling held that he could make a mistake there. That’s all.

All in all S.73, true, it refers to handwriting and finger impression. But what I said the last time was that all it talks is about identification. And DNA also talks about identification and were said to be in the book that we cited before your Lordship to be the closest to finger print. The status of the DNA test is closest to finger pints. That’s why we said why not we extend this, because when S73 was enacted there is no DNA test. The law is a living thing, it should develop.

S.165 is a section of general application. It does not have any conditions before it can be invoked. The only consideration is that it is invoke so justice can be done. It is invoked so the court can obtain the proper truth. And it is not we presume that certain things have been proved.

What the literature said is this, what is admitted or proved under S. 73 was the DNA that we have adduced is that recovered from the anus, and then we need to compare it with someone which we recover in the cell. But bearing in mind now that that evidence with regards to whatever collected from the cell was held to be inadmissible, that’s the reason why we invited the court to exercise your discretion or powers under S.73 and S.165 individually or read together to order Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim to make available the specimen.

So on this thing, [] talks about you cannot ask an accused person to be a witness in his own trial. I believe the literature had all stated it is true. But there is nothing stopping the court from taking it from him if he doesn’t want to surrender. What he cannot do is to produce himself if he doesn’t want to.

And the court cannot force him to produce it but the court can order for it to be taken from him.

That’s all, YA.

KS: Just one point, YA. The Evidence Act has not been amended to include the court of law directing an accused person to provide his DNA profiling. My learned friend is asking your Lordship to do what the legislature should do and if such there is an amendment to the Evidence Act []. This court has no power. J KC Vohrah has made it very clear. I am made to understand from my learned friend’s submission the Evidence Act does not apply in civil case…

YA: He said apply, but some other people think it didn’t apply. As far as he is concern, it applies. That is what I understand from his submission.

KS: Alright. If it applies clearly what J Vohrah had said…I don’t think we should read again. It is very clear.

“There is no general power provided by the legislation or through common law for any court in Malaysia to order a person to undergo a test to ascertain the paternity. The case of a DNA test, it is common knowledge that either a blood, tissue or bone specimen will be taken from the person for testing…”

And if it is done without his consent then it will be an offence under S.323 of the Penal Code. We say nothing has [] in the main trial. If anything had emerges, it strengthens…

YA: You are submitting. Actually it is supposed to be at the end …

KS: []. Just to impress upon your Lordship.

YA: It is already in your submission.

KS: Very well if your Lordship got it there. []

YA: It is obvious I cannot make my decision today. I need time to go through. By Wednesday? Give me one or two days to go through.

KS: With regard to what I said just now about Prime Minister committing obvious contempt of your Lordship ruling. Your lordship might want to make a ruling on that.

YA: If you really think the way you do, you can file the application in the management unit and they will handle it. Now we have the management unit to handle all file for the cases in all courts. That’s all.

[10.09 a.m.]

PERBICARAAN ANWAR IBRAHIM - KES LIWAT 2 - 2011 - HARI 49

TRANSKRIP PERBICARAAN DATUK SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM 15 MAC, 2011

Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 KL
Di hadapan Yang Arif Dato’ Mohamad Zabidin Mohd Diah

Pihak-pihak:
PP: Semua hadir
PB: SN, Datuk Param Cumaraswamy (KS, Ram Karpal, Dato’ CV Prabhakaran, Marissa, Radzlan tidak hadir)
WB: Zambri Idrus (for complainant)
AI hadir

[9.04 a.m.]

MY: YA, hari ini telah ditetapkan untuk hujahan balas oleh pihak pembelaan.

SN: My Lord, I’ve been informed by Mr. Karpal Singh at about 11 p.m. yesterday, that his youngest brother who was in Penang High Court passed away, and he went there yesterday itself. I was also informed by Mr. Karpal that there is ceremony in the community. And being the eldest brother, he has to conduct personally and he won’t be able to make it to court at least on Monday.

YA: Why can’t be tomorrow?

SN: There will be a lot of certain things that he must conduct as the eldest brother, and it is very religious and customary. It is his responsibility

YA. So as a result of which, I wish that this matter will be postpone to at least Monday.

YA: Datuk Yusof?

MY: YA, it is very difficult for me to object, and that considering that Encik Karpal is not that mobile, I believe that I have no objection to this application because considering the religious and ritual that they have to go through.

SN: There will be put the ashes in the sea and I believe, there are full of ceremony event take place in this 4, 5 days, YA, because of the ritual. As a result of this, I think it is unfortunate that the timing is caught with the court case and all. We hope Your Lordship will consider Mr. Karpal’s situation.

YA: So then we continue on Monday lah, at 9 a.m.

[9.06 a.m.]

PERBICARAAN ANWAR IBRAHIM - KES LIWAT 2 - 2011 - HARI 48

TRANSKRIP PERBICARAAN DATUK SERI ANWAR IBRAHIM 14 MAC, 2011

Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 KL
Di hadapan Yang Arif Dato’ Mohamad Zabidin Mohd Diah

Pihak-pihak:
PP: Semua hadir
PB: KS, SN, Ram Karpal, Datuk Param Cumaraswamy, Marissa, (Dato’ CV Prabhakaran, Radzlan tidak hadir)
WB: Zambri Idrus (for complainant)

[9.19 a.m.]
MY: Hujahan bagi 2 permohonan pendakwaan untuk mahkamah yang mulia ini menyemak semula ruling yang dibuat di akhir perbicaraan dalam perbicaraan berkaitan dengan admissibility keterangan berkaitan eksibit yang diambil di sel lokap IPK KL dan juga permohonan di bawah Seksyen 73 dan 165 Akta Keterangan untuk Mahkamah ini memerintahkan DSAI memberikan sampel untuk DNA analisis.

KS: YA, before my learned friend proceeds, there are certain matters of more than [] consent must also involved this court. This is with regard of the mischievous report, scandalous report, contentious report, of NST of

Saturday and this morning, and also in Utusan Malaysia which we have copies for it, before we proceed, may be your Lordship wants to look at it. On Saturday, the report was “Anwar [] to give DNA sample to the court.

“Demonstration”, as reported in today’s newspaper. “Prosecution files application citing from Evidence Act from judges power”.

The first time in legal history of this country this is happening. The submission of the AG in fact on the internet even before my learned friend started up just now. The entire set of the submission, [] it happened all the time, but for my learned friend to leak out his submission to the internet, for i.e in Malaysia Today, in entirety.

First, this court must of itself, there is no point we filing an application, but it must be the consent from the court in which the court must call upon those who have leak this report, those who reported it, and those who taking part in the demonstration, we want you them to be decided as contempt of court. We want that to be decided first, before my learned friend gets on to the submission which already in the public knowledge. I’m shocked that my learned friend took that role. My learned friend is in the hand of politicians now. It is normal to think YA, here, as representing the Public Prosecutor, he is being manipulated. He is allowing himself to be manipulated.

We want a ruling on that, YA. One, on how that report got leak, YA, or rather the submission and the demonstrators, YA, the manner in which the entire issue had been politically exploited. What is with the press, and what the demonstrators in demanding is in fact intermediating this court, intermediating your Lordship to make an order for DSAI to supply his DNA profile. That is contemptuous. We would wish you to make a ruling on that.

We want to see your Lordship in chambers now, before my learned friend proceeds, unless of course if my learned friend wants to show it here, now, himself which we had prepared for. Let me make it very clear to him. But we rather see you in chambers now. At the moment, that would be all.

MY: I will reply to that, My Lord. I would like to think that professionally, throughout this trial, I do my battle in court, not outside. Now, whether or not the public knows that I am making this application, I have stated this in open court last Friday, that we are going to make an application that we have take out the extraction, which upon based on the premise. Now, the causes had been distress as much as the causes [], that when the submission we prepared was published. As lead counsel, I take responsibility on that. But the issue is this, whether or not it is contemptuous.

My Lord, not long ago, in the open court before Komathy J, I complaint about an affidavit filed not referred to in court being published in the newspaper. Of course, if we were to read the Etiquette Rules, under Section 50A that you cannot have it published until that particular paragraph had been referred to in the open court.
But we have a decision by Abdul Wahab J, who said that it’s all right because the public has the right to inform. But now, what about this, it is a submission, only a submission. We are not making an allegation, it is only excerpt on Sarkar on Evidence, which anybody can have access to, and can read. It is nothing will have the effect prejudicing the trial. If the members of the public, one of the parties want to demonstrate, not because of the submission but because of the application and that has nothing to do with the prosecution.

I am a bit sad that my learned friend made accusation that I allow myself to be manipulated by the politician. I will not let myself to be used by anybody. I think as long as this concern, I answered to no one, except to this Honorable

Court. To what extent that this will prejudicing your mind, bearing in mind that this is not a jury trial. I don’t see why en. Karpal can be so emotional about it. I don’t think that it is really anything. It just that the submission go out earlier than it should be. And I pray to your Lordship not to entertain the application by my learned friend to call anybody and cite them to contempt. Thanks.

KS: We reply, Publication of an affidavit, there’s nothing wrong with that. It is a public document. But a publication of a submission, my learned friend just now not denied that it was leak out and must be leak out from him.

Let’s have…

YA: Since just now you indicate that you want to see me in chamber, so can I see both parties in chamber?

KS: Yes.
[9.29 a.m.] Stand down.

[9.32 a.m.] Pihak-pihak masuk ke Kamar Hakim.
[9.42 a.m.] Pihak-pihak keluar dari Kamar Hakim.

[9.47 a.m.]
YA: With regard to the issue brought by the defence team just now, I only have this to say: the trial is ongoing therefore I remind parties not to do anything that could hinder the smooth running of this trial. Anything done is amount to contempt, those responsible will face it. That’s all.

KS: Much obliged.

MY: Much obliged.

MY: Dengan izin, YA. My Lord, the first application by the prosecution is to urge your Lordship to review your ruling at the end of the trial within a trial with regard to the admissibility of the evidence pertaining to exhibits collected in the cell and evidence of Puan Aidora, the chemist.

My Lord, authorities has held that in order to decide whether there is basis to exclude any evidence the court can look at the evidence both in the trial within a trial and later the evidence adduced during the substantive trial. And the onus is on the party seeking exclusion to prove on the balance of probabilities.

The existence of a basis, for that may I just read some passage from Hanafi b. Mat Hassan v PP [2006] 4 MLJ 134, paragraph 74 at page 170. If I may read my Lord,

“Be that as it may, the party that is seeking to have evidence excluded in the exercise of the discretion of the court has the onus of showing, on the balance of probabilities, that the discretion should be exercised in its favor.”

Two cases were cited, PP v Mohd Farid b. Mohd Sukis and [] v PP. So, if your Lordship remembers the particular page in PP v Mohd Farid b. Mohd Sukis is page 412. What they are saying is that the defence has the onus on the standard of civil case, i.e. balance of probabilities and they have to show more than likely that the basis exist. It is like 51% over 49%. [].

My Lord, as far as the cases goes whether or not the court has the power to review, we have in our bundle 6 cases.

The first case is R v Watson [1980] 2 All ER 293. The question post to the court can be found at page 294, paragraph F. It says,

“The first ground of appeal [] the judge was wrong in law in holding that he had no power to rule on the admissibility of evidence at the end of the prosecution case because he had rule on it in trial within a trial even though there were relevant matters that case in light in the trial that had not done so in the trial within a trial.”

This case concerned caution statement. If I can invite your Lordship to page 293, the headnotes where the Court of Appeal had to say,

“Because a judge retains controls over the evidence to be submitted to the jury throughout a trial, he is not precluded, by the fact that he has already ruled at a trial within a trial in the jury’s absence that a written statement by the accused is admissible in evidence as being voluntary, from reconsidering that a ruling at a later stage of the trial if further evidence emerges which is relevant to the voluntary character of the statement.”

So it says here if it can show that there are now fresh evidence which may help to show to the court that whether or not there could or could not be a basis then the court can always reconsider and then make an appropriate ruling.

The second case is Dato’ Mokhtar Bin Hashim v PP [1983] 2 MLJ 233 at page 236, paragraph D on the left, it would appear that the defence team had applied to the court for review of the question of voluntariness of his cautioned statement.

And from paragraph F downwards to the right hand column, the judge did in fact reviewed and still maintain its ruling.

And page 245 of the report again at paragraph D on the left, the court was invited to review by the defence team of Dato’ Mokhtar Hashim the evidence of Sudin and the the evidence of Datin Norsiah in the light of another new evidence in the form of testimony of Batumallai, ASP Ibrahim and the testimony of YB Mohd Salleh and the RTM film.

Of course on the right hand column the [] paragraph, it would seem that the court after having review the ruling says that,

“In my view the so call new evidence does not alter the situation.”

Meaning, basically it maintains the ruling.

No.3 in the list is PP v Ng Lai Huat & Ors [110] 2 MLJ 427. This is with regard to the admissibility of a certain conversations which my learned friend En. Karpal and En. Shafee Abdullah submitted to be hearsay and should not be admitted. It starts from page 428 paragraph G-I on the right hand column but I would just read page 429 left column the top paragraph. If I can read my Lord,

“I heard briefing submissions made by learned defence counsel Encik Karpal Singh, Encik Shafee Abdullah and the learned DPP Encik Jalaluddin Saleh, at the end of which, after due consideration of the brief submissions made, I

ruled that the utterances in respect of the demands made were admissible as I was of the opinion at that time, that the facts contained in the utterances in respect of demands made by Jimmy Chua to PW13 in the light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution had been shown to be logically relevant under s 10 of the Evidence Act 1950.”

But later the judge reconsidered his ruling at page 430, paragraph F left column,

“I have dealt here at length with the basic principle of hearsay evidence because I am of the view that the demands made by Jimmy Chua to PW13 formed the superstructure of the prosecution’s case. I was wrong to admit the evidence of PW13 in relation to Jimmy Chua’s purported demands in the early part of the prosecution stage. I therefore reverse my earlier ruling on this point and rule that those purported demands are inadmissible for being hearsay.”

This is one case where the ruling was reconsidered by the judge own his own motion, not because there is new evidence emerges. Because he thinks that he could have erred in relying the principle of law applicable to the factual

situation.

Then we have the case of R v Allen [1992] Cri LR 297. We can see what was held there at page 298,

“Held, dismissing the appeal, the judge had a discretion whether to readmit the evidence and had exercised it correctly”

If I may invite your Lordship to the commentary there,
“Commentary: This is an unusual case. The judge took the view that the question put to the officer in cross-examination (which concerned an alleged conversation about the turning-out of the accused’s pockets) was unfair in that the officer was left in the position where he had to say “There was indeed a conversation but this was not it.” It would have left the jury with a misleading impression had the prosecution version of the conversation not been out, notwithstanding the judge’s earlier decision to exercise his discretion against admitting it because the safeguards against verballing in Code C has been broken (though this is often a relevant consideration) but the extent to which the admission of the evidence would adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings. In this case the balance of fairness shifted during the trial, and the judge was entitled to reconsider his ruling. [D.J.B.]”

And the last case is R v Hassan [1995] Crim LR 404. The same thing the judge reconsidered his ruling. The relevant page will be page 405. Whether or not the judge has a power to review his ruling is there, either because the judge thinks there are new evidence emerging which may change or alter the character of the evidence that it had before that or before the ruling was made or because the judge is of the view that he may have erred in the application of the

law.

YA, with regard to the first basis of the review, emergence of new evidence, we are saying we have now call in the substantive trial both the IO and the arresting officer. The IO’s and this officer’s evidence would conclusively prove that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest was legal and lawful and that he was informed of the ground of his arrest.

It was the evidence of Supt. Taufik that warrant of arrest was served and acknowledged by Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim and in fact he signed it at the back there. This document, the warrant of arrest now that we have the original which we don’t have for some reason during the trial within a trial, we have it then during the substantive trial and prove it. We produced the original, we showed to the court where Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim signed. And Taufik said he read what was stated in the warrant of arrest. And what was stated in the warrant of arrest was substantially the charge.

This evidence apart from suggestion by my learned friend that did not inform the ground of arrest to Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was never disputed, not challenged. My Lord, it is trite law that if you don’t challenge, you don’t dispute, you accept. And you don’t challenge it simply means you cannot dispute and you accept. Now what is accepted is that he was read the warrant of arrest and he acknowledges it. Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim through his counsel did not challenge that it was his signature there at the back of the warrant.

The case is not in my bundle my Lord which says if you don’t challenge you accept is the case of Chua Beow Huat v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 29 and Wong Swee Chin v PP [1981] 1 MLJ 212.

Then we have the oral testimony of the IO. First, he said “I faxed a letter asking Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim to surrender himself on 16.07.2008 at 2.00 p.m.” And in that letter it was mentioned that he had applied for the warrant of arrest. This was never disputed, P86. Then he said he has the warrant given to Taufik to be executed. And before the recording of his statement was done, again he told Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim in this term – that there was a report,

Travers Report by Saiful Bukhari who had alleged that he was sodomised by Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim between 3.00-4.00 p.m.at 11-5-1 Kondominium Desa Damansara. This was never disputed.

YA, we made, I mean we try to tender the statement recorded pursuant to S.112, only the first 4 pages. I’m not sure whether YA would agree to have that part of the statement marked as exhibit. I know the law says that 112 statements is no admissible except for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching but here what was being admitted is not the statement. It is just before the statement was recorded. Be that as it may, before we showed the IO the statement he had already testified with regard to what he told Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim.

KS: I wish to interrupt my learned friend. But it is marked as an ID. If it is an ID, it can’t be referred to in submission. It is trite law. It is not an exhibit. []

MY: YA, I mean that is the purpose of my submission, to have it converted to exhibit because..but I’m aware of the law.

YA: Proceed.

MY: Now this positive assertion by this witnesses and if your Lordship want to compare what happened during the trial within a trial, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim did not denied. Here, he did not challenge it. During the cross-examination he did not denied that he was informed by the IO before the recording of the statement. Neither he denied he was served and signed the warrant of arrest.

Now, if we were to sit as a civil court having the defence to prove on the balance of probability that he was not informed of the ground of arrest obviously they have failed. In fact this is one instance where in the civil case the defence can submit there is no case to answer, they don’t have to adduce evidence. Whether you called the evidence rebuttal or defence, they don’t have to. Because even by their own evidence they have not been able to show to the court that they have material which the court can comfortably act upon in order for the court to “Yes, you were not informed” by their own concession during trial within a trial. Now the positive evidence unchallenged would put all doubt to rest that he was in fact informed of the warrant of arrest.

How much he was informed, may I refer again to the case of Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [1989] 3 MLJ 121. I may invite your Lordship to page 122, holding no.6,

“For the purposes of the first limb of art 5(1) of the Constitution, all that an arrested person is entitled to demand for is to be informed, at the earliest possible moment, not in detail and not necessarily in strict legal terminology, but only in general terms, by virtue of what power he is being arrested and of the grounds of his arrest. But enough must be made known to him to afford him the opportunity of giving an explanation of any misunderstanding or of calling attention to other persons for whom he may have been mistaken with the result that further inquiries may save him from the consequences of a false accusation.”

In fact this is what Cristie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 [] is all about. It says when you arrest a person you must tell him why so that he can say, for example if you say he is involed in a murder of Ahmad on a certain date and time, he can say “Look, you are mistaken. I was somewhere else at that time.” So the whole idea telling him in general term what offence he has committed, and when and where is to enable him to explain himself, if he is accused of murder he can say “Look, I was acting in defence.” In fact, at the time of arrest it was the first time an accused is afforded with the opportunity to put up his defence, alibi, explanation and If he could not deny the fact that he did stab somebody but he did it in self-defense.

So that is as far as Chong Kim Loy is concerned, we have satisfied. The prosecution has satisfied that. So if the court is with me that the arrest is lawful then it is only right for your Lordship to reconsider your ruling and say because the arrest is lawful, the subsequent detention is lawful and whatever obtained pursuant to that has not been obtained by unfair or illegal means.

Now, the question may be post is there one or two arrest? If both lawful or one of them is lawful and if one of them is lawful which one of them?

If your Lordship remember, Supt Taufik arrested this accused, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim 200 meters from his house and he was not acting under the instruction of the IO, he was acting under the instruction of Dato’ Bakri. The instruction is, if Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim did not go direct to IPK he must be arrested. It would appear from that statement that Bakri must have known about the existence of the letter faxed by Jude to En. Nair that he is required to be there by 2.00 p.m. It is the basis there. And he was arrested by virtue of S.377B of the Penal Code, a sizable offence.

He said subsequently he was given the warrant and he served it which we think is a mere formality. But supposing that it is not so, there is a second arrest at the instance of the IO and this is what we have to say, Jude testified that on 15.07.2008 not only he applied for warrant of arrest, he also faxed the letter asking Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim to surrender himself by 2.00 p.m. the next day and that he had applied for a warrant of arrest. And it is in his testimony he said at the time when he applied for the warrant of arrest he has reasonable suspicion under S.23 of Criminal Procedure Code in that he had the report, he had the statement of the complainant, he had viewed the CCTV, he had the medical report, and he had the chemist report by Dr. Seah that those materials are more sufficient for him to form an opinion that he has more than reasonable suspicion to effect an arrest under S.377B against Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, in which he did.

When Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was brought to IPK whether legally or illegally he had the warrant of arrest executed. He had the warrant executed and the warrant was explained and then before the recording of the statement he was again informed Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim. If this constitute the second arrest, then this second arrest is lawful and the detention of Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was made pursuant to this arrest. It is our contention both are lawful.

But in the event there was two arrests and the first one is unlawful, the second is lawful.

In the case of Ooi Ah Pua v OC Criminal Investigation, Kedah Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 where the complaint there to the court is whether or not when the person is denied his right to counsel, he can have his detention to be declared null and void. Before the Federal Court, the Federal Court says there is no issue before the court. The issue is whether or not he was informed of the ground of arrest. If I may read the particular paragraph at page 201 starting from para H on the left, this is what the Federal Court has to say,

“So much therefore regarding the issue as framed by Mr. Karpal Singh. But with all due respect, I do not think that that is the real issue before the learned judge and before us. This being an application under section 365 of the

Criminal Procedure Code and under article 5(2) of the Constitution, with respect I agree with Encik Lamin for the respondent that the real issue is a simple one, namely this, whether or not Ooi was lawfully detained. If so, the court should not release him; if not, the court should release him. As to this the affidavit evidence is very clear. There was an armed robbery, a seizable offence, and there was a reasonable suspicion that Ooi was concerned in that offence, and Inspector Amiruddin not only had power to arrest him without a warrant (section 23(i)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code), he was also under a duty to do so. By the time this application was filed on January 5, 1975, Ooi had been detained by order of a magistrate, and so there was no question of his detention being unlawful.”

So we are saying if the court says the first arrest was unlawful, by the time the ruling is obtained he was already arrested pursuant to a valid legal powers for a sizable offence for which the IO had reasonable suspicion. It is true my

Lord it was not denied by En. Judy that there was communication between him and En. Nair but that was before he decided that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was a suspect. By 15.07.2008, he said that “Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was a suspect, I had all the materials and I applied for the warrant of arrest”.

So whatever communication or understanding between the parties has superseded by this event, hence the faxed letter, the letter faxed to En Nair. As far as s 15 is concern, it doesn’t matter how the arrest is effected, one of it when the suspect submitted himself. If Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim had any intention to go to IPK that day obviously then he was submitting himself to a notification by the IO that he was going to arrest him. So it doesn’t make the communication between the IO and En. Nair did not make the arrest less than lawful.

That is the first part of the submission, emergence of new evidence.

Now I go to the second basis, the Ng Lai Huat basis. While in Ng Lai Huat the judge on his own motion reconsiders it because he thought he was wrong, here the prosecution is urging your Lordship to review because we perceived that there is a misapplication of the principle of the law when your Lordship make the ruling.

YA, it all started with Kuruma where the Privy Council held that the test of admissibility is relevancy. If evidence is relevant then it must be admissible no matter how it was obtained. Subsequently in 1980 the House of Lords in R v

Sang modified it a little bit.

If I may refer your Lordship to R v Sang [1980] AC 402 to what the House of Lords held is this at page 431 paragraph A,

““Does a trial judge have a discretion to refuse to allow evidence-being evidence other than evidence of admission-to be given in any circumstances in which such evidence is relevant and of more than minimal probative value”.

The House of Lords says there are 2 situations when the court can exercise discretion to exclude admissible evidence. No.1, where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. No.2, a judge has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means. Your Lordship has no choice, you cannot exclude it just because it was obtained by improper or unfair means except save with regard to admission, confession, and evidence obtained from the accused after commission of offence. This is something like R v Payne. The court is not concerned with how the evidence is obtained, meaning other than these three categories of evidence the court shouldn’t be concerned how it was obtained. So long as it its relevant, it is admissible.

Now, no.1 is the facts of our case shows that there was an admission? This is not an admission. Is it a confession? No, it’s not a confession. Is it obtained from the accused himself? No. In another part of the judgment it says if of the search from his premises but if it was obtained from the accused himself or his premises then it must be confessionary in nature. Confession is something that by itself would show the guilt of the accused without more.

What is the evidence that we collected among other thing which is relevant was toothbrush, Good Morning towel and the bottle. Was it collected from the accused? It wasn’t. Was it collected from his premises? They were not. The evidence itself would show that this is not the time where the court has a discretion to exclude. The nature of the evidence itself doesn’t fall within the category of evidence that this Honorable court has a discretion to exclude.

If I may read page 435 of the judgment, paragraph B-H. Actually it starts from the previous page but if I can just read the second paragraph of page 435,

“It is interesting in this connection to observe that the only case that has been brought to your Lordship’s attention in which an appellate court has actually excluded evidence on the ground that it had been unfairly obtained (Reg. v .

Payne [1963] 1 W.L.R. 637) would appear to fall into this category the defendant, charged with drunken driving, had been induced to submit himself to examination by a doctor to see if he was suffering from any illness or disability, upon the understanding that the doctor would not examine him for the purpose of seeing whether he were fit to drive. The doctor in fact gave evidence of the defendant’s unfitness to drive based upon the symptoms and behavior in the course of that examination. The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge ought to have exercised his discretion to exclude the doctor’s evidence. This again, as it seems to me, is analogous to unfairly inducing a defendant to confess to an offence, and the short judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal is clearly based upon the maxim nemo debet prodere se ipsum.”

“In no other case to which your Lordships’ attention has been drawn has either the Court of Criminal Appeal or the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal upon the ground that either magistrates in summary proceedings or the judge in a trial upon indictment ought to have exercised a discretion to exclude admissible evidence upon the ground that it had been obtained unfairly or by trickery or in some other way that is morally reprehensible; though they cover a wide gamut of apparent improprieties from illegal searches.”

The court has never interfered when the Magistrate or the High Court admitted the evidence on the ground that it was obtained unfairly and by unlawful means. This ground is not sufficient to have the evidence excluded.

“Nevertheless it has to be recognized that there is an unbroken series of dicta in judgments of appellate courts to the effect that thre is a judicial discretion to exclude admissible evidence which has been “obtained” unfairly or trickery or oppressively, although except in R v Payne [1963] 1 W.L.R. 637, here never has been a case in which those courts have come across conduct so unfair, so tricky or so oppressive as to justify them in holding that the

discretion ought to have been exercised in favour of exclusion.”

The next following sentence is important, YA.

“In every one of the cases to which your Lordships have been referred where such dicta appear, the source from which the evidence sought to be excluded had been obtained has been the defendant himself or (in some of the search cases) premises occupied by him;…”

Either than admission and confession, the evidence must be obtained from the accused or his premises.

“…and the dicta can be traced to a common ancestor in Lord Goddard’s statement in Kuruma v The Queen [1955] A.C. 197 which I have already cited. That statement was not, in my view, ever intended to acknowledge the existence of any wider discretion than to exclude (1) admissible evidence which would probably have a prejudicial influence upon the minds of the jury that would be out of proportion to its true evidential value; and (2) evidence tantamount to a self-incriminatory admission which was obtained from the defendant, after the offence had been committed, by means which would justify a judge in excluding an actual confession which had the like self-incriminating effect.”

My lord, before I read the other part of R v Sang, may I now take your Lordship to the case Ajmer Singh v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 141, a Singapore case where R v Payne was considered. The factual of the case are the same in Ajmeer and R v Payne. Starting from 2nd paragraph of page 6 where R v Payne was reffered to and the short facts were reproduced. Then I go to the fourth paragraph,

“I come now to the submission on lack of consent on the part of the appellant in giving a specimen of his blood to PW1. In R. v. Trump, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant had not given his consent because he gave it in response to a warning to him. But the Court of Appeal also held that “Giving the blood was very close to making an admission…”

I skip that my Lord. Then in the six lines from below, this is what the Singapore court has to say

“But, even assuming that no consent had been given, the appellant would still have to overcome the hurdle as to whether the evidence amounted to an involuntary confession or admission of a nature that renders the evidence inadmissible. In Pakala Narayana Swami v Emperor (1939) 66 IA 66; AIR 1939 PC 47 Lord Atkin said that “A confession must either admit in terms the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence.”

Here, if there had been any confession or admission, it was merely to the fact that the appellant had an excessive amount of alcohol in his blood and not to the fact that he was unable to control his scooter whilst under the influence of drink.

So in Ajmer he was charged for driving while under the influence. Blood was taken from him without his consent and whether or not that amounted to confession the court had to say nothing, it only shows there is alcohol in his blood. That’s all, his blood.

With regard to the 3 exhibits, zero. it doesn’t come within what Lord Atkin term it to be confession or S.17 term it to be confession. It doesn’t say anything. It merely say that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim must have drink from this bottle, that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim had used this towel, that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim must have used this toothbrush. It does not relate him to the offence. We still have to have to have this hurdle to say that “Look, the DNA here matches the DNA sample found in the sperm cells in the anus.” apart from showing by oral evidence through Saiful that this offence actually took place. So at any rate my Lord, what we are saying not only the evidence collected was not collected from the accused himself or his premises is not confessionary in nature. If it is not, the your Lordship has no discretion to exclude it. Your discretion is not triggered.

If I may now invite your Lordship to the judgment of R v Sang at page 433 with regard to the probative value and the prejudicial effect,

“Recognition that there may be circumstances in which in a jury trial the judge has a discretion to prevent particular kinds of evidence that is admissible from being adduced before the jury, has grown up piecemeal. It appears first in cases arising under proviso (f) of section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, which sets out the circumstances in which an accused may be cross-examined as to his previous convictions or bad character. The relevant cases starting in 1913 with Rex v. Watson (1913) 109 L.T. 335 are conveniently cited in the speech of Lord Hodson in Reg. v. Selvey [1970] A.C. 304, a case in which this House accepted that in such cases the trial judge had a discretion to prevent such cross-examination, notwithstanding that it was strictly admissible under the statute, if he was of opinion that its prejudicial effect upon the jury was likely to outweigh its probative value.”

Then it refers to similar facts. If I may read 434,

“…but in Harris v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1952] a.c. 694, 707, Viscount Simon, with whose speech the other members of this House agreed, said that the discretion to exclude “similar facts” evidence should be exercised where the “probable effect” (sc. prejudicial to the accused) “would be out of proportion to its true evidential value.

That phrase was borrowed from the speech of Lord Moulton in R v Christie. That was neither a ‘previous conviction’ nor a ‘similar facts’ case, but was one involving evidence of an accusation made in the presence of the accused by the child victim of an alleged indecent assault and the accused’s failure to answer it, from which the prosecution sought to infer an admission by the accused that it was true. Lord Moulton’s statement was not confined to evidence of inferential confessions but was general in its scope and has frequently been cited as applicable in cases of cross-examination as to bad character or previous convictions under the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 and in ‘similar facts’ cases. So I would hold that there has now developed a general rule of practice whereby in a trial by jury the judge has a discretion to exclude evidence which, though technically admissible, would probably have a prejudicial influence on the minds of the jury, which would be out of proportion to its true evidential value.”

KS: I wish to interrupt. My learned friend has gone through it earlier.

YA: He has the right.

KS: He has gone into it earlier.

YA: Those are last time. This is now. Let him submit.

KS: Waste of judicial time and taxpayers money.

MY: “Up to the sentence that I have emphasised there is nothing in this passage to suggest that when Lord Goddard CJ spoke of admissible evidence operating ‘unfairly’ against the accused he intended to refer to any wider aspect of unfairness than the probable prejudicial effect of the evidence on the minds of the jury outweighing its true evidential value…”

With regard to that holding no. 1 what they are saying is this there may evidence which will not prove the charge, similar facts and all other evidence. While technically admissible, the court has to consider whether or not prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value. But that kind of evidence is not the evidence we seek to admit. It doesn’t belong to the same class of bad character, previous convictions or similar facts. It is direct evidence, almost.

It is corroborative in the sense that it confirms. It helps to confirm identity of the perpetrator of the crime not by directly relevant.

So, if I may then just refer to two cases Hanafi b. Mat Hassan v PP [2006] 4 MLJ 134 and Wan Mohd Azman bin Hassan v PP [2010] 4 MLJ 141. But before that YA, in submission we refer to O’Brien [2005] 2 AC 534 at page 16 of that report where it says when you talk about the probative value that the probative value outweigh the prejudicial effect, the evidence we adduced must be so probative, it is so supportive of the fact that we are supposed to prove. In that sense then the discretion does not apply.

The case of Hanafi b. Mat Hassan v PP [2006] 4 MLJ 134, holding no 6. This is where blood specimen was taken from the accused while he was handcuffed. The Court of Appeal in that case at page 136 of the report, holding no. 6 says,

“(6) The court has no discretion to refuse to admit evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained if it is relevant. Therefore, the evidence relating to the blood sample taken from the accused was admissible as it was relevant even if it was taken without his consent (see para 68).”

The judgment proper is at page 168 paragraph 64.

“(e) The use of the blood sample taken from the accused
[64] It was the stand of the defence that the blood samples taken from the accused for the purpose of conducting the DNA tests were not taken voluntarily. It was argued that even though no evidence was adduced by the accused on this issue the evidence relating to the blood sample must be excluded in the exercise of the discretion of the court as the available evidence shows that he was handcuffed at the time thereby rendering the taking of the blood sample involuntary.”

And it says on what case the objection was anchored. And at page 169, paragraph 68 the judge says,

“It is therefore clear that the court has no discretion to refuse to admit evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained if it is relevant. This rule applies, inter alia, to cases involving illegal searches, evidence obtained by secret listening devices or by undercover police operations. It also applies to evidence obtained by unfair procedures. Thus in R v Apicella (1986) 82 Cr App R 295, the English Court of Appeal upheld a rape conviction based upon the results of tests carried out on a specimen of body fluid obtained from the accused for medical reasons whilst he was on remand. In AG for Quebec v Begin (1955) SCR 593, it was held that even if a blood sample was obtained from the accused without his consent it is admissible to prove intoxication. It follows that the evidence relating to the blood sample taken from the accused is admissible as it is relevant even if it was taken without his consent.”

The next paragraph where they refer to R v Sang still exclude that if it operates unfairly which phrase same from the judgment to make only this, when the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.

The case of Wan Mohd Azman bin Hassan v PP [2010] 4 MLJ 141is also in point, it is a Federal Court decision at page 150, paragraph 16,

“[16] Also the propriety of obtaining the evidence with the use of an agent provocateur would not impair the fairness of the trial itself as this passage from Lord Diplock’s judgment in R v Sang [1980] AC 402 suggests. His

Lordship said:

For the fairness of a trial according to law is not all one-sided; it requires that those who are undoubtedly guilty should be convicted as well as that those about whose guilt there is any reasonable doubt should be acquitted. However much the judge may dislike the way in which a particular piece of evidence was obtained before proceedings were commenced, if it is admissible evidence probative of the accused’s guilt it is no part of his judicial function to exclude it for the reasons.

[17] And Lord Salmon, in the same case stated the same proposition in a more forceful manner when he said:

A man who intends to commit a crime and actually commits it is guilty of the offence whether or not he was persuaded or induced to commit it, no matter by whom. This being the law, it is inconceivable that, in such circumstances, the judge could have a discretion to prevent the Crown from adducing evidence of the accused’s guilt — for this would amount to giving the judge the power of changing or disregarding the law. It would moreover be seriously detrimental to public safety and to law and order, if in such circumstances, the law immunised an accused from conviction.”

And at page 153 under the heading of Similar Facts Evidence, Discovery And The Agent Provocateur’s Evidence, the court was urged to conduct a balancing exercise. So the court says it may apply to similar facts, it may apply to S.27 but it doesn’t apply to agent provocateur. So my submission is that it doesn’t apply to our case.

My learned friend had on occasion cited the case of Goi Ching Ang which is not the authority of our case. Goi Ching Ang is a case of S.27 at the most it may amount to a confession which even R v Sang agreed if that confession is obtained by inducement, threat or promise or by trick the court has the discretion, which is not the case here. []. Goi Ching Ang merely restates the law, nothing more.

Applying the law into the facts, we are saying the arrest was lawful and justified in law. Therefore all evidence was properly and lawfully obtained. In the event the arrest of the Respondent deemed to be illegal and evidence improperly obtained, it does not trigger the exercise of the court’s discretion for the following reasons:
(i) The evidence is not in the categories envisaged by R v Sang. It is not admission, confession or obtained after commission offence, from the accused himself or his premises. The evidence is not confessionary in nature.
(ii) Its prejudicial effect if any does not outweigh its probative value. It shows very strongly probative of the Respondent guilt.
(iii) Its not even a sample taken from accused himself which under normal circumstances can be taken without his consent.

For this, we are referring to s.5 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There was in evidence that Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was taken to the hospital to have blood specimens taken. Under the law, we can take hair sample. S.5 of Criminal Procedure Code read together with S.63 of PACE because S.5 says if there is no procedure in Malaysia then we apply the law of England.

We then refer your Lordship to the case of PP v Sanassi [1970] 2 MLJ 198. In Sanassi, the three elections does not originates from here. The three elections was found in the laws of England. By virtue of S.5 of the then Ordinance the court said we applied that law here, the three alternatives so the same thing.

What s.63, we have it in our bundle when it comes to non-intimate samples we can take it without the consent provided that he is in the custody for a sizable offence. Here Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim was in custody for that kind of offence.

If I may, tab 12 of my bundle page 1689, the bottom part of the page.

“Other samples
63. (1) Except as provided by this section, a non-intimate sample may not be taken from a person without the appropriate consent.”
(2) consent to the taking of a non-intimate sample must be given in writing.
(2A) A non-intimate sample may be taken from a person without the appropriate consent if two conditions are satisfied.
(2B) The first is that the person is in police detention in consequence of his arrest for a recordable offence.
(2C) The second is that –
(a) He has not had a non-intimate sample of the same type and from the same part of the body taken in the course of the investigation of the offence by the police, or
(b) He has had such a sample taken but it provided insufficient.”

So as far as the prosecution is concerned when he was taken to the hospital that night both the conditions have been satisfied for only non-intimate sample. For intimate sample, that is a different matter. We will leave it for submission. But in this particular case we didn’t take anything from him. Zero. No sample was taken from this person. If the law can recognized that we can take it without his consent, what more this obtaining of contact DNA or traced DNA from the bottle, from the towel, and from the toothbrush.

It was our submission that the evidence pertaining to the collection of the exhibit in the lock-up cell and the result of the DNA test should be admitted. It is the right and lawful thing to do. I rest my submission.

YA: The second application?

MY: Can we stand down for 10-15 minutes before I start with my second application?

YA: So we proceed sekali?

MY: Yes, I’ll make application and my learned friend will respond to both applications.

YA: Stand down for a while.

[10.52 a.m.] Stand down.

[11.28 a.m.]
SN: YA, Mr. Karpal is now going to the other court, but we have no problem with the submission to proceed.

MY: Dengan izin, YA. This is an application by the Public Prosecutor for an order that this Honorable Court direct the respondent, who is the accused in case to give a non-intimate or intimate sample of himself (the accused), as this Honorable Court deems fit, with a view for this court to compare the DNA of the accused with the DNA sourced from semen found in high rectal swab and low rectal swab obtained from the anus of SP1 and given the nomenclature ‘male Y’ by the chemist (SP5).

We make this application based on Section 73 and Section 165 either individually or read together.
Section 73, if I may read in our bundle, tab 2:
“(1) In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal, admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been written or made by that person, may be compared by a witness or by the court with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing or seal has not been produced or proved for any purpose.
(2) The court may direct any person present in court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by that

person.
(3) This section applies also, with any necessary modifications, to finger impressions.”

Before we proceed on why Section 73 may be used for that purpose, YA, may I just say that Section 73 is a provision that enable the court to direct any person, and any person as we go to the authorities later, includes the accused present in the court to give specimens, handwriting or finger impression. Section 73 does not give the power to the court to compel the accused to give the specimen or the finger impression. The powers under Section 73 is invoked only when the court feels it is necessary in the interest of justice to make such comparison for the purpose of coming to a conclusion of fact along with other evidences.

In this case, we have the evidence of Saiful and few other evidences which may point to the accused but the presence of the semens of the anus if which compared may have the court for the purpose of coming to a conclusion of fact along with other evidence. Whenever the accused is directed to either give [], he may decline because of the principle that an accused cannot be a witness against himself but it can be taken or seized from him.

But for this purpose YA, may I invite you to tab 14 page 1316 onwards, Sarkar’s Commentaries on Evidence:
“In another group of cases it was held that the words “to be a witness against himself” should be given a liberal interpretation and that under a search warrant or any other kindred process of law, documents or articles or any other incriminating evidence can be seized from the custody of the person of the accused by force against his will, such as stolen articles, blood-stained clothes etc, but he cannot be compelled to produce them himself. For the same reason, an accused person can be taken to a doctor for the examination of injuries on his body so as to ascertain whether he could not have participated in an occurrence. He can also be taken to an identification parade to enable the prosecution witnesses to observe his physical features with a view to identify him. The taking of thumb impression or signature of the accused does not stand on a different footing from the seizure of documents or articles or other facts of evidence from the person of the accused. Though he cannot be compelled to produce such evidence, it can be taken or seized from him.

In the same way, it has been held that taking the finger impression of the accused under the magistrate’s order under the Identification of Prisoners Act is not violation of Article 20(3). The principle of such decisions is that the constitutional inhibition prohibits compulsion or force in obtaining oral or written testimony. But truth is not endangered where the compulsion is used for the exhibition of the body or of any identifying marks on it, for purposes of comparisons with evidence produced in the trial. Similarly, the finger prints, foot prints, palm prints, photographs of the accused, for purpose of comparison with those found at the scene of the crime do not lose their probative character whether they have been obtained voluntarily or involuntarily. In principle resort to compulsion requiring the accused to exhibit his body for purposes of establishing the identity is not objectionable, because by doing so he is not being bound to give false testimony. In fact he does not testify at all and the physical facts which are notice speak for themselves. The permissibility of identification by finger, palm and foot prints and the taking of the accused’s pictures after arrest, blood and urine test, use of emetic stomach pump or similar device for extracting ornaments swallowed etc. requiring suspect or accused to wear or trying on particular apparel or requiring defendant in a criminal case to exhibit himself or perform physical acts during trial and in the presence of the jury are not hit by the immunity conferred by Art 20(3). Even if it is assumed that the accused’s thumb impression was taken by the police for comparison by compulsion or use of force.”

Page 1317:-

“ It was thought that the exhaustive judgment in Sharma’s case as to the meaning of the words “to be a witness against himself” will settle the law as to the limits of the protection under art 20(3) but that hope was soon dispelled as on the question whether a direction on the accused to give his finger impression or specimen writing, or to compel him to give such impression or writing, infringed art 20(3), the different High Courts interpreted Sharma’s case in different ways and in a few case two benches of the same High Court came to different conclusion. There was therefore a confusion of law as to what the expression to be a witness against himself meant or what constituted violation of art 20(3).”

Page 1318:-

“The Supreme Court by a majority held that:-
3. Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of body by way of identification are not included in the expression ‘to be a witness’ in art 20(3). It must be assumed that the constitution makers were aware of section 73 Evidence Act or ss 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Axr, 33.
4.
5. The majority of eight judges held that to be a witness means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation. But mere production of some material evidence whether documentary or otherwise which is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him does not come within the expression ‘to be a witness.”

Page 1319:-

“Under the Supreme Court decision, however giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression to be a witness in art 20(3). In other words, when an accused who is asked to give his finger impression does not voluntarily obey the order he may be compelled to do so and it would not be an infringement of art 20(3). Further, s 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act authorizes a magistrate to allow measurements or photographs to be taken if he is satisfied that it is expedient for the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under Criminal Procedure Court to do so. The principle of Supreme Court decision appears to be that finger or palm expressions or any mark on scar on the body is a fact of evidence which the accused carries on his body and to force him to display such evidence for purpose of identification is not included in the expression ‘to be a witness’ and does not therefore infringe art 20(3). As observed by the Supreme Court: “When an accused person is called upon by the court or any other authorities holding an investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, h is not giving any testimony of the nature of a personal testimony. The statement or refuse to make any statement but his finger impression or handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character”.

As already observed, para 2 of sec 73 unquestionably authorizes the court to direct the accused to give specimen writing or finger impression but it appears that directing an accused to give his finger impression under sec 73 has been equated by the Supreme Court in S v Kathi Kalu, with calling up on him to give specimen writing. There is however a clear distinction between the two. If a direction to give finger impression is met with refusal, it is permissible under the law to compel the accused to give it. In this operation the accused remains passive and it is the person taking the impression who does an act. But when the accused refuses to give specimen writing, it is not possible to get it from him as to write is to do “a positive volitional evidentiary act” and unless he is willing to co-operate, he can never be made to write”.

Page 1320:-

“The following observations of that most eminent American Judge Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v US are pertinent and shed much light:-
“Another observation is based upon an extravagant extension of the 5th amendment of the American constitution. A question arose as to whether the blouse belonged to the prisoner. A witness testified that the prisoner put it on and it fitted him. It is objected that he did this under the same duress that made his statement inadmissible and that it should be excluded for the same reasons.

But the prohibitions of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibitions of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when

it may be material. The objecting in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover, we need not consider how far a court would go in compelling a man in exhibiting himself. For when he is exhibited whether voluntarily or by order, and even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material is competent.”

In several other American cases, it has been held that the prohibition against compelling an accused person to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of coercion or physical or moral compulsion to extort oral or written communications and not of exposure of his body or the taking of finger impression or photograph for the purpose of identification.”

Now, YA, from the reading of this commentary it is obvious that your Lordship to not do is to ask him to surrender the sample but the court can order someone else to take the sample from him because the provision with regard to a person not to be a witness only applies to oral communication and anything in writing from him and not otherwise.

The question is why are we relying on sec 73? From specimens of finger impressions, expert can determine the author of a particular writing or the person who handled any particular object thus [] the perpetrator of a crime.

Similarly, DNA profile helps to identify the perpetrator of a crime, but if I may invite you to para 26 at page 12 of our submission, page 12:-

[26] In the first chapter of his book under the heading – Introduction to criminal DNA, Andrei Semikhodskii wrote:
“Solving a crime is a difficult task. The challenge faced by criminal investigator, though simple, is not trivial – correctly to identify the perpetrator and bring him/her to justice. This can be achieved in a number of ways, by examining eyewitness accounts and physical evidence, DNA evidence has possibly the highest probative value of all, on par with fingerprints evidence in identifying an individual.”

At para 20, page 11:-

[20] “In legal practice, examination of DNA has two major applications – non criminal and forensic applications. The main difference between forensic and non-criminal DNA analysis is the purpose of testing. The purpose of forensic DNA testing is to identify whether a crime scene sample matches a DNA from the suspect.”

My Lord, it would appear then, that a body sample taken from suspect or accused from which DNA profile can be obtain come from the same class of evidence of specimens of handwriting, finger prints impression or urine.

So section 73 should then be construed to extent and to exclude bodily sample whether intimate or non intimate.

We also relying on sec 165, tab 3 of our bundle. Section 165, YA [] invoked by this Honorable Court with the object to discover, to obtain proper fruit of relevant facts. So what are relevant facts in this case? Whether or not the sperm cells, the DNA had been obtained to match DNA of the accused? Court must invoke his power to give truth to both parties and justice is to be done. Now, if I may invite you to our written submission at page 8:-

[11] It was commented at page 2488 in Sarkar’s Law of evidence on the principle and scope of sec 165 of the Evidence Act that “this is a very important section. The judge may exercise all the privileges and powers which he has under the Act or any statute of interrogating witnesses and requiring the production of evidence and yet they may be insufficient to elicit the truth or to get all the facts necessary for a proper decision. The chief function of a judge is to see that justice is done between parties, and a too rigid adherence to set rules may sometimes embarrass the judge in performance of his duties and defeat the ends of justice.

At page 9:-

[12] It was also said at p 2489 that “The position of a judge is not that of a moderator between contestants in a game with no inclination to interfere till the violation of its rules. He has a much higher duty to perform. He has to see not only the proceedings are conducted strictly according to law, but to administer justice and to find out the truth. He must therefore according play an active part and it is not only his right but it is his duty to ask the witness any question in any manner, the answer to which in his opinion would aid in the discovery of truth”.

[13] It had also been said that “Counsel seek only for their client’s success; but the judge must watch that justice triumphs”. The object of the exercise of this power of interrogation must be to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts”. With this object, the judge may also direct the production of any document or thing.”

Page 10:-

[15] In this case we have the evidence of the complainant, SP1 that he was sodomised by the accused. It was in evidence that ejaculation took place. SP1 had informed various persons immediately after the incident. SP1 gave a clear and vivid description as to how he was sodomised to Dr. Razuin who took down his history at HKL. All these facts have not been seriously challenged by the defence.

[16] As a result of the medical examination of SP1, the swabs taken from the anus of the complainant. Both the swabs were analyzed by the chemist, SP5 and it was found to contain semen of a person known as ‘Male Y’.

[18] In fact, the prosecution had submitted earlier before this Honorable Court in one of the numerous interlocutory applications filed by the accused that the existence of semen in the anus of a complainant would show conclusively that anal penetration had taken place.

[19] In the course of the investigation, the police managed to secure 3 exhibits left behind by the accused in a cell where he was detained overnight and the sole DNA profile of these exhibits conclusively matched the DNA profile of

Male Y but this Honorable Court had refused to admit these 3 crucial exhibits tendered by the prosecution for purpose of matching.

At page 11:-

[21] In the present case, apart from the oral evidence of the complainant, SP1, we have a DNA profile sourced from semen of a person known as Male Y found in the swabs taken from the anus of the complainant. This is a crime scene sample.

[22] It is not only logical but absolutely sensible for an accused person facing a charge of carnal intercourse against the order of nature, in order to exonerate himself, to voluntary offer his DNA sample for matching with that of the crime scene sample.

At page 12:-

[23] Be that as it may, this Honorable Court is clothed with the power and duty under sections 73 and 165 of the Evidence Act to direct the accused in this case to give either a non-intimate or intimate sample of himself for purpose of matching with the crime scene in order that the truth may be discovered and more importantly that justice is administered according to law.

[25] It is in the interest justice that this application is premised upon that an innocent person must be acquitted and a guilty one be held liable for his crime.

At page 13:-

[27] Pursuant to the above explanation, it is incumbent upon this Honorable Court to direct the accused herein under Section 73 of the Evidence Act read together with Section 165 of the same act to provide a non-intimate or intimate sample of himself for purpose of comparing with the sample taken from the crime scene.

[28] We could do no better than to hearken to the explanation of author Andrei Semikhodsii that:
“The criminal justice system now relies heavily on DNA-based evidence. All over the world, thousands of people have been convicted of various crimes with the help of DNA evidence, and hundreds of wrongfully convicted people have exonerated. DNA analysis has become an indispensable police tool, as it allows unambiguous identification of the criminal by traces of biological material left at the crime scene and the acquittal of innocent suspects, based on DNA evidence. The importance of this silence but faithful witness in fighting crime cannot be underestimated.”

At page 14:-

[29] It is exactly with this purpose in mind i.e. in discovering the truth that an innocent accused be acquitted and a guilty one be convicted which render the application of section 73 of the Evidence Act to be so cogent and crucial in the circumstances of this case.

YA, Section 73 say you exercise your power when there is dispute. Here, clearly there is dispute of DNA profile in Saiful’s anus, so now we asked to compare. We asked the court to invoke your power under Section 73. My Lord, it is true that there had been no application like this before. But just because no application made before, it doesn’t mean that it cannot be done, or else, sec 73 and 165 would be just a [] of the law. Both the sections are there to serve the purpose. And the purpose is exactly what we [] today.

Conclusion of page 14.

[30] With justice paramount in this case, we respectfully urged this Honorable Court to direct the accused, DSAI to provide a non-intimate or intimate sample of himself, as this Honorable Court deems fit, for the purpose of comparing with the DNA profile of the semen sample found at the crime scene, in this case from high rectal and low rectal swab that taken from the complainant.

Either individually, or read together Sec 73 and 165, give this court such power [] to make order that we pray for.

I’m supposed to take you to certain authorities but the authorities here are those mentioned in the commentaries, but if I may quickly run through, the first case is the case of Nga Tun Hlaing, tab 4 page 115. If I may just read the headnotes:-

“Section 73 specifically directs that any person present in court may be directed to make a finger impression for the purpose of comparing it with any finger impression alleged to have been his. There is no exception made in favor of an accused person. Sec 342 Criminal Procedure Court does not prohibit the taking of the finger impressions from an accused.”

The second case, Emperor v Ramrao Mangesh Burde and Others, tab 5 page 313, the court held:-

“I should only like to add in conclusion that although there is nothing illegal in the accused having been made to write by the police officers of the rank I have referred to, especially when the charge against the accused is one of forgery, as there is nothing either in the Criminal Procedure Court or in the City of Bombay Police Act which prohibits it, it would be generally desirable in the interests of the administration of justice in a criminal trial that for the purposes of comparison the accused should be made to write or to give his finger impression in court under the direction of a Magistrate or a Judge. If the accused refuses to write or to give his finger impression in court, an adverse inference may even be drawn against him in respect of the charge on which he is brought to trial.”

Case number 6, Golam Rahman and others v The King is same with case number 1.

Case number 7, Ram Swarup, if he refuses to comply, whatever condition that invoke should be invoke.

Case number 8, Prakhar Singh & Anor says that to do all this is not something that is objectionable.

Case number 9, Subayya Gounder v Bhoopala Subramaniam, page 002/007:-

“The permissibility of identifications by finger palm and footprints and the taking of accused’s pictures after arrest, blood and urine tests, use of the emetic stomach pump or similar device for extracting ornaments swallowed etc requiring suspect or accused to wear or trying on particular apparel or requiring defendant in criminal case to exhibiting himself or perform physical acts during trial and in presence of jury are not hit by the Immunity conferred by Art 20(3) and do not offend that due process clause”.

Case number 11, Ranjit Ram v State page 456:-

“An order directing an accused person to furnish his fingerprints or specimens does not amount to testimonial compulsion and does not contravene the provisions of art 20(3) of the constitution.”

Case number 12, Pali Ram first page 2nd para:-

“In addition to section 73, there are two other provisions resting on the same principle, namely section 165 of Evidence Act and section 540 Criminal Procedure Court (equivalent to sec 256 of our Criminal Procedure Court). What between them invest the court with wide discretion to call and examine and one as a witness, if it is bona fide of the opinion that his examination is necessary for a just decision of the case.”

Also [read] page 16 of the report:-

“It was argues on behalf of Pali Ram accused…that the power of the court is limited to the extent only where the court itself is of the view that it is necessary for its own purpose to take such writing in order to compare the words or figure alleged to have been written by such person and that this power does not extend to permitting one or the other party before the court to take such writing for the purpose of its evidence or its own use. It was further argued that Section 73, Indian Evidence Act did not entitle the court to assist a party to the proceedings. It entitled the court only to assist itself for a proper conclusion in the interest of justice. I have applied this test to the present case before me. It is true that here it is the prosecution which has made this request. But the observation contained in this ruling cannot be stretched to the extent, the defence wants me to do it. Ex, PW-21/F was stated by Tekchand to be in

Pali Ram’s handwriting when he made statement before the police. In his statement during the committal proceedings he resiled from it. This document is undoubtedly a vital link. It has an important bearing on the case as Pali Ram himself happens to be an accused. In this peculiar situation it becomes necessary to take recourse to the court’s power under sec 73 in the interest of justice and to ask Pali Ram to give specimen handwriting (to have it examined by handwriting expert) and then to decide about it. Under these circumstances, I think it fit to allow the request of the prosecution in this regard”.

So YA, the same applies here. There is dispute that on the allegation, even we have the semen in the anus, and the other party it was not happened that way. So we have obtained the necessary evidence but it was ruled not to be admissible. We have the situation where the evidence was there but for technical reason it was ruled not to be admissible. To satisfy the court to do justice to the witness and the accused; that we made this application. And we would seriously urge the court to consider this application. The principle of section 73 which includes and should extent to DNA evidence to allow us to direct the accused to take necessary sample for the purpose of comparison so that the truth could be discovered. Thanks.

KS: My Lord, second application made by my learned friend, as conceded by him that it is unprecedented.

YA: We cannot hear you from behind. You must come here in front because the microphone is here.

KS: As I stated earlier, the second application is unprecedented, it is considered by my learned friend. My learned friend is going on the presumption that the DNA evidence here is conclusive. What we need is time, to reply in detail to my learned friend’s submission, so that your Lordship would not be in a position []. So could we have until tomorrow, YA?

YA: Datuk Yusof?

MY: I have no objection.

YA: Ok, we start at 9 am tomorrow.
[12.09 p.m.] Adjourn.